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Long-Run Relationship of U.S. and
Argentine Maize Prices
Atanu Ghoshray
This paper examines the relationship between the maize export prices of the
United States and Argentina. The results suggest an asymmetric nature of price
adjustment. This could be due to the fact that the maize market is characterized by
significant concentration. The larger market share of exports by the United States
reflects the influences on export price dynamics. The structure of maize trade is
such that U.S. markets are largely insulated from influences flowing from Argen-
tina, while Argentine maize prices are not insulated from U.S. influences.
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International price relationships in agricultural commodity markets have been of
considerable interest to economists because of issues such as price transmission,
market integration, and price leadership. If an international commodity market were
to be integrated, one would expect, through arbitrage and/or substitution, the prices
charged by major exporters of that commodity to move together. A price change in
one market will be followed by a gradual similar price change in the other market,
thereby disallowing the prices of the commodity to diverge too far from each other.
When a group of prices move proportionally to one another over time, then the Law
of One Price (LOP) holds. From an econometric point of view, this would imply that
prices of the commodity should be cointegrated.
International trade in many products is dominated by relatively few agents on
either or both sides of the market (Karp and McCalla, 1983). The international maize
market is a case in point. The major maize exporting countries over the past decade
include the United States (U.S.) and Argentina. The U.S. is the world’s largest maize
exporter, accounting for approximately 70% of total maize exports in the world
maize market. In comparison, Argentina’s exports of maize over the last decade
have been considerably lower, accounting for approximately 13% of total global
exports [U.S. Department of Agriculture/Foreign Agricultural Service (USDA/FAS),
2001].
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1  During the period analyzed, China has emerged as a significant net exporter of maize for the last three marketing
years (King, 2001; Ray, 2003).
Maize is one of the world’s most important grains, and is produced and consumed
across the globe. Maize provides the basic staple for human consumption in much
of Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America, the Andean region, and parts of Asia. It is
also used as feed for livestock in middle- and upper-income countries (Falcon and
Naylor, 1998). During the last decade, the total quantity of maize produced globally
averaged approximately 560 million tons. Over this same period, the total quantity
of maize traded averaged 65 million tons, which is approximately one-eighth of total
world production (Meng and Ekboir, 2001).
The structure of the world maize market can be characterized as an oligopoly
(Ray, 2003). This perception is driven by the fact that the U.S. and Argentina are the
two major exporters of maize and are geographically widely separated. Together, the
U.S. and Argentina account for over 80% of the world export of maize [Meng and
Ekboir (2001), as developed from USDA/FAS 2001 data]. Traditionally, the maize
export market has been dominated by the U.S., whereas Argentina by comparison
exports significantly lower volumes of maize (Lence, 2000). China is somewhat of
an anomaly, acting as both a major exporter and importer during the last decade
(Meng and Ekboir, 2001).
1 As the dominant exporter, the U.S. would be expected
to act as a price leader and Argentina as a price follower.
If the market system were perfectly competitive, then price increases should be
transmitted to the same extent as price decreases (Goletti and Babu, 1994). However,
because the international maize export market exhibits a structure more consistent
with an oligopoly than a perfectly competitive market, the price transmission is
likely to be asymmetric. An important point frequently overlooked in the literature
is that if the underlying process of adjustment is asymmetric, the tests for
cointegration and its extensions are misspecified (Enders and Siklos, 2001). Recent
developments in time-series analysis have recognized the potential for threshold type
adjustments in error correction models. Threshold effects occur when price increases
bring a different response than price decreases.
Based on a review of the literature, no previous study has examined the price
dynamics in the international maize market. Argentina’s current and future export
potential could have a major impact on U.S. maize exports. Years of fiscal reform
and improvements in infrastructure have laid the groundwork for Argentina’s emer-
gence as a serious year-round, global competitor to the U.S. in the maize market.
The extent of such competition is reflected in figure 1, which illustrates the volume
of maize exports for the U.S. and Argentina over the 1992S93 through 2002S03
study period. Despite the difference in market share for maize exports, it can be seen
from figure 1 that U.S. maize exports generally tend to move in an opposite direction
to those of Argentina.
Argentina has been expanding into the Middle East and North African markets,
where the U.S. had already established a strong presence (USDA/FAS, 2003b).
Further, when the European Union implemented a ban on nonapproved geneticallyGhoshray U.S. and Argentine Maize Prices   81
2  Ardeni (1989) attempted to verify the Law of One Price (LOP) focusing on a small number of commodities which
included wheat in addition to wool, beef, sugar, tin, tea, and zinc. Baffes (1991) conducted a similar study to test
whether the LOP holds for wheat as well as beef, tea, sugar, wool, zinc, and tin. Both studies employed cointegration
tests. Goodwin and Schroeder (1991); Mohanty, Meyers, and Smith (1999); and Bessler, Yang, and Wongcharupan
(2002) examined the price relationships in the international wheat market following a cointegration approach. Asche,














































Source: Grain: World Markets and Trade, USDA/FAS.
Figure 1. U.S. and Argentine maize exports (000s of tons),
1992S S S S93 through 2002S S S S03
modified (GM) maize in 1997S98, U.S. exports of maize plummeted (figure 1).
Because Argentina planted only the approved varieties of maize, its exports
expanded—driven primarily by demand from Spain, Portugal, and the UK. The
intense competition between U.S. and Argentina for maize exports over the last
decade warrants serious consideration in investigating the long-run relationship
between Argentina and U.S. export prices of maize.
The primary objective of this paper is to examine the relationship between the
maize export prices of the U.S. and Argentina. Cointegration analysis is a useful
technique for investigating the price relationships in international commodity
markets (see Ardeni, 1989; Baffes, 1991; Goodwin and Schroeder, 1991; Asche,
Bremnes, and Wessells, 1999; Mohanty, Meyers, and Smith, 1999; Bessler, Yang,
and Wongcharupan, 2002).
2 The motivation of such research is to define market
boundaries and identify any causal relationships that may exist among prices for
commodities in the same market. If the commodities belong to the same market,
there will exist a long-run relation between prices driven by arbitrage and/or
substitution. In this way, by examining the relationships between prices over time,
the relevant market can be defined. The extent of the market (Stigler and Sherwin,82   Spring 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
3  Smith, Goodwin, and Holt (1995) and Mohanty, Meyers, and Smith (1999) employed Granger causality to test
for price leadership in the international wheat market. Asche, Bremnes, and Wessells (1999) and Bessler, Yang, and
Wongcharupan (2002) used weak exogeneity tests to determine whether price leadership exists in the world salmon
and wheat markets, respectively.
1985) implies that the commodity prices in different geographical locations tend to
move together.
Given the imperfect market structure of the global maize market, this study aims
to test for the presence of cointegration in the presence of asymmetric error correc-
tion. An attractive method of estimation and testing follows the approach reported
by Enders and Siklos (2001). Noting there is a correspondence between error correc-
tion models representing cointegrating relationships and autoregressive models of
an error term, the approach used here is an application of the Enders and Siklos
(2001) threshold autoregressive (TAR) and momentum-threshold autoregressive
(M-TAR) method of adjustment.
Under the TAR model, the underlying price series might exhibit asymmetry where
one price remains above the other price, but for short intervals, the lower price peaks
above the higher price (Ghoshray, 2002). For the M-TAR model, the underlying
price series might display asymmetry of the following form: When prices are
decreasing, the gap between the prices decreases at a faster rate as opposed to the
case when both prices are increasing (Ghoshray, 2002). In both cases, this type of
asymmetric price behavior differs from the symmetric adjustment scenario where
both prices move together and any transitory deviation in “levels” or “rates of
change” is corrected in a symmetric manner.
A further objective of this paper is to use these price relationships to provide infor-
mation on the existence of price leadership. In particular, we address the question
of whether the U.S. is driving the maize export prices. The issue of price leadership
is of interest because the maize market is perceived to be imperfectly competitive,
and as the dominant exporter, the U.S. is capable of exerting market power—a
prerequisite for any kind of price leadership role. Previous studies (e.g., Smith,
Goodwin, and Holt, 1995; Asche, Bremnes, and Wessells,1999; Mohanty, Meyers,
and Smith,1999; Bessler, Yang, and Wongcharupan, 2002)
3 have tested for price
leadership in various international commodity markets.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. First, the econo-
metric model is presented, followed by a description of the data. The empirical results
are then discussed, and in the final section conclusions are drawn from the analysis.
The Econometric Model
The Engle and Granger (1987) two-step method to test for cointegration between
two variables, say prices P1t and P2t, entails using ordinary least squares (OLS) to
estimate the long-run relation of the two prices. This is represented by:
(1) P1t ' α % βP2t % gt.Ghoshray U.S. and Argentine Maize Prices   83
Here, P1t and P2t are nonstationary I(1) prices; α and β are the estimated parameters,
where α is an arbitrary constant that accounts for the differential (transfer costs and
quality differences), and β denotes the price transmission elasticity; and gt is the
error term which may be serially correlated. To test the hypothesis, equation (1) is
estimated using OLS. The second step advocates a Dickey-Fuller test on the esti-
mated residuals of (1), given by:
(2)   ∆gt ' γgt&1 % ωt,
where ωt is a white noise error term. If ωt is not white noise, an augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test may be used where lagged values of ∆gt may be added to (2).
Rejecting the null hypothesis of no cointegration (H0: γ ' 0) implies the residuals of
(2) are stationary. Thus, (1) is like an attractor such that its pull is strictly propor-
tional to the absolute value of gt.
However, Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2001) argue that
the tests for cointegration and its extensions are misspecified if adjustment is
asymmetric. They consider an alternative specification, termed the threshold auto-
regressive (TAR) model, whereby (2) can be rewritten as:
(3)   ∆gt ' Itγ1gt&1 % (1 & It)γ2gt&1 % ωt,
where It is the Heaviside Indicator function such that:
(4)   It '
1i fgt&1 $ τ,
0i fgt&1 < τ.
This specification allows for asymmetric adjustment. If the system is convergent,
then the long-run equilibrium value of the sequence is given by gt ' τ. The sufficient
conditions for the stationarity of gt are γ1 < 0, γ2 < 0, and (1 + γ1)(1 + γ2) < 1
(Petrucelli and Woolford, 1984). In this case, if gt–1 is above its long-run equilibrium
value, then adjustment is at the rate γ1; if gt–1 is below long-run equilibrium, then
adjustment is at the rate γ2. The adjustment would be symmetric if γ1 ' γ2. However,
if the null hypothesis H0: (γ1 ' γ2) is rejected, then using the TAR model we can
capture signs of asymmetry. If, for example, !1 < γ1 < γ2 < 0, then the negative phase
of the gt series will tend to be more persistent than the positive phase.
In the above case, it is necessary to estimate the value of the threshold that will
be equal to the cointegrating vector. A method of searching for a super-consistent
estimate of the threshold was undertaken by using an approach proposed by Chan
(1993). To utilize Chan’s methodology, the estimated residual series was sorted in
ascending order, i.e., g1 < g2 < ÿ < gT, where T denotes the number of usable obser-
vations. According to this method, the largest and smallest 15% of the gt series were
eliminated, and each of the remaining 70% of the values were considered as possible
thresholds. For each of the possible thresholds, the equation was estimated using (3)84   Spring 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
and (4). The estimated threshold yielding the lowest residual sum of squares was
deemed to be the appropriate estimate of the threshold.
In equation (4), the Heaviside Indicator depends on the level of gt. Enders and
Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2001) suggest an alternative such that the
threshold depends on the previous period’s change in gt. The Heaviside Indicator
given by (4) can be set to the Momentum-Heaviside Indicator as:
(5)   It '
1i f∆gt&1 $ τ,
0i f∆gt&1 < τ.
In this case, the series gt exhibits more momentum in one direction than the other.
The model given by (3), along with equation (5), depicts the momentum threshold
autoregression (M-TAR) model. The M-TAR model can be used to capture a differ-
ent type of asymmetry. If, for example, |γ1| < |γ2|, the M-TAR model exhibits little
adjustment for positive ∆gt–1, but substantial decay for negative ∆gt–1. In other words,
increases tend to persist, but decreases tend to revert quickly back to the attractor
irrespective of where disequilibrium is relative to the attractor.
To estimate the threshold, Chan’s (1993) methodology is employed. The esti-
mated residual series was sorted in ascending order: ∆g1 < ∆g2 < ÿ < ∆gT, where T
denotes the number of usable observations. As before with the TAR model, the
largest and smallest 15% of the gt series were eliminated, and each of the remaining
70% of the values were considered as possible thresholds. For each of the possible
thresholds, the equation was estimated using (3) and (5). Again, the estimated thresh-
old yielding the lowest residual sum of squares was deemed to be the appropriate
estimate of the threshold.
To implement in this test the case of the TAR or M-TAR adjustment, the Heaviside
Indicator function is set according to equation (4) or equation (5), respectively, and
equation (3) is estimated accordingly. The Φ-statistic for H0: (γ1 ' γ2 ' 0), the null
hypothesis of stationarity of gt, is recorded. The value of the Φ-statistic is compared
to the critical values computed by Enders and Siklos (2001). If the null hypothesis
can be rejected, it is possible to test for asymmetric adjustment since γ1 and γ2 con-
verge to multivariate normal distributions (Tong, 1990). The F-statistic is used to
test for the null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment, H0: (γ1 ' γ2). Diagnostic
checking of the residuals is undertaken using the Ljung-Box Q-tests to ascertain
whether the ωt series is a white noise process. If the residuals are correlated,
equation (3) needs to be reestimated in the form:
(6)   ∆gt ' Itγ1gt&1 % (1 & It)γ2gt&1 % j
p
i'1
φ | i∆gt&i % ωt.
Equation (6) is comparable to (3) except that it incorporates lagged first differences
of the dependent variable to correct for the autocorrelation in the error term ωt. The
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) is used to determine the lag length.Ghoshray U.S. and Argentine Maize Prices   85
Empirical Analysis
Data
The data used for this analysis are monthly average export price quotations (FOB)
from July 1993 through January 2003. The maize prices considered in this study are
for the Argentine Rosario and U.S. Yellow No. 3 from the Gulf port. The data were
obtained from World Grain Statistics published by the International Grains Council.
All prices are quoted in U.S. dollars. The subsequent analysis of the data is carried
out on the logarithm of prices. Figure 2 illustrates the maize export prices from the
U.S. and Argentina. As observed from this graph, the prices appear to move together
over time.
Empirical Results
The prices were initially tested for their order of integration. Table 1 presents the
results of the unit root tests for each of the price series, expressed in log levels.
Based on the ADF test results for the variables in levels and growth form, the prices
are nonstationary I(1).
Following the Engle and Granger (1987) methodology, the first step entails
estimating the long-run equilibrium relationship given by equation (1) and then
conducting the ADF test on the residuals of (1). The results of the test are reported
in table 2. The ADF test was conducted with 2 lags determined by the Schwarz
Bayesian Criterion (SBC). The key point to note is that the ADF t-statistic is !6.04,
indicating the null of no cointegration can be rejected, and therefore both the prices
are cointegrated.
The residuals of (1) are estimated in the form of the TAR and M-TAR models.
The consistent estimate of the threshold value using Chan’s (1993) method was
found to be !0.071 and !0.039, respectively. The results of the TAR model are
shown in the second numeric column of table 2. The point estimates are calculated
as γ1 ' !0.46 and γ2 ' !0.30, which have the correct signs for convergence. The
statistic Φ ' 19.41 is greater than the 5% critical value, implying the null hypothesis
of no cointegration can be rejected. Given that cointegration is detected, the null
hypothesis of symmetric adjustment can be tested using the standard F-distribution.
The sample value of F ' 2.00 has a p-value of 0.16. Consequently, the null of sym-
metric adjustment cannot be rejected.
The last column of table 2 reports the results using a consistent M-TAR model.
The point estimates of γ1 ' !0.33 and γ2 ' !0.76 suggest convergence. The statistic
Φ ' 24.56 allows us to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 5%
significance level. The null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment provides a sample
value of F ' 9.72 with a p-value of 0.00, implying the null can be rejected. Given
the finding of asymmetric adjustment, the power of the Φ-statistic in this case
exceeds that of the Dickey-Fuller test (Enders, 2001). Finally, the Ljung-Box




























































Source: World Grain Statistics, International Grains Council.
Figure 2. U.S. and Argentine maize export prices (U.S. $/ton),
July 1993 through January 2003
The estimates of γ1 and γ2 are expected to be negative, suggesting convergence for
the M-TAR model. Since |γ1| < |γ2|, the M-TAR model exhibits little adjustment for
positive ∆gt–1, but substantial decay for negative ∆gt–1. Specifically, increases tend
to persist, but decreases tend to revert quickly back to the attractor. Thus, when using
the M-TAR consistent model, the results suggest we can find evidence of asymmetric
adjustment.
The positive finding of cointegration with threshold adjustment justifies the esti-







































where denote the export prices of Argentina and the U.S., respectively; P AR and P US





The number of lags (p) is determined using the SBC. The results from the TECM
are reported in table 3.
The p-values for the error correction terms indicate that adjusts to deviations P AR
from the long-run equilibrium at the 10% significance level. In the short run there
is no evidence of any causality. The lagged changes in both the prices affect move-
ments in the short run. However, there is no indication of Granger causality. Finally,
the diagnostics suggest the model does not suffer from serial correlation.Ghoshray U.S. and Argentine Maize Prices   87
Table 1. Results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
ADF t-Test
Price Series Levels Growth Form
Argentina !2.50  [1] !7.10*  [0]
United States !2.11  [1] !7.20*  [0]
Notes: An asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5% level. Numbers within brackets denote lag length determined
by the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion.




[p-Value]   Estimate
 (t-Statistic)
 [p-Value]   Estimate
(t-Statistic)
[p-Value]
!0.39 (!6.04) !0.46 (!5.72) !0.33 (!5.03) γ1
   NA !0.30 (!3.50) !0.76 (!5.68) γ2
0.37 (4.60) 0.38 (4.70) 0.34 (4.33) φ | 1
0.07 (0.85) 0.06 (0.73) 0.14 (1.56) φ | 2
Φ-Statistic    NA 19.41* 24.56*
H0     NA 2.00 [0.16] 9.72 [0.00] (γ1' γ2)
Ljung-Box Q-Statistic    0.73 [0.94] 0.53 [0.97] 1.64 [0.80]
 Notes: An asterisk (*) denotes significance at the 5% level. The values corresponding to Φ are compared with the
 Φ tables computed by Enders and Siklos (2001).






 Coefficient/Statistic Estimate [p-Value] Estimate [p-Value]
!0.14 [0.07] 0.13 [0.08] ECM
%
t&1
!0.52 [0.00] 0.16 [0.27] ECM
&
t&1
0.49 [0.00] 0.03 [0.76] ∆P
AR
t&1
0.03 [0.79] 0.34 [0.00] ∆P
US
t&1
 Durbin-Watson (DW) Statistic 1.97 1.96
 Ljung-Box Q-Statistic 1.67 [0.79] 2.42 [0.65]88   Spring 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
Examining the results of the weak exogeneity test, the F-statistic for the null
hypothesis that the Argentinean price is weakly exogenous [i.e., H0: (µ1 ' µ2 ' 0)]
is estimated to be 7.11 with a p-value of 0.00, implying rejection of the null
hypothesis. Testing the null hypothesis that the U.S. price is weakly exogenous
[H0: (π1 ' π2 ' 0)], the F-statistic is estimated to be 2.09 with a p-value of 0.12. The
significance level of the U.S. price (12%) does not allow us to reject the null
hypothesis that the U.S. price is weakly exogenous.
Discussion of Results
Using the Engle-Granger framework, a long-run relationship is found to exist
between the U.S. and Argentine maize prices. The results of the cointegration test
imply that the prices for both countries are integrated. This result supports the notion
that in the world maize market, better quality and more effective transmission of
market information have led to more stability in export pricing, with Argentina’s
export prices being closely linked to U.S. prices (USDA/FAS, 1998).
When testing for asymmetric adjustment, we find there is little evidence when
using the consistent TAR model. However, where evidence of asymmetry is
detected, the consistent M-TAR model best fits the data. Using the M-TAR model,
the absolute value of γ1 is estimated to be less than the absolute value of γ2. This
finding indicates the M-TAR model exhibits slow amounts of adjustment toward
equilibrium for a positive change in the equilibrium relationship, but a substantial
amount of adjustment for a negative change in the equilibrium relationship. Thus,
positive changes tend to persist, while negative changes tend to revert quickly back
to the attractor. The results of the M-TAR consistent model appear to suggest that
the underlying process of adjustment is asymmetric.
The path of adjustment to equilibrium exhibiting M-TAR type adjustment to the
long-run equilibrium relation is relatively faster when the price differential is
decreasing as opposed to the case when it is increasing. When prices are decreasing,
the gap between the prices decreases at a faster rate in contrast to the case when both
prices are increasing. The finding of this asymmetric pattern of adjustment supports
the contention that the international maize market is characterized by imperfect
competition. As stated earlier, imperfect competition gives rise to asymmetric price
transmission. When the Argentine maize price is increasing, the U.S. price increases
at a faster rate, and when the Argentine maize price is decreasing, the U.S. maize
price decreases at a relatively slower rate. Due to Argentina’s lower share of total
exports of maize, Argentine maize prices would have to decrease at a faster rate in
order to retain their market share.
This relative price movement can be observed from the graph in figure 2. Apart
from the price increases in 1995S96, there is a general downward trend of the maize
export prices for both the U.S. and Argentina. Over the periods when the Argentine
maize export price is decreasing, the U.S. maize price decreases at a relatively
slower rate. This verifies the inference made from the econometric analysis.Ghoshray U.S. and Argentine Maize Prices   89
The nature of price dynamics might explain the impact that Argentina could have
been making on the international maize market. Since the early 1990s, Argentina has
posed a challenge to the U.S. for maize exports by expanding into Middle East and
North African markets, where a strong U.S. presence had already been established.
The North African market—comprised of Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco—
imports a total of 8.6 million tons of maize. Egypt and Morocco have traditionally
purchased 80% of their maize from the U.S., with Argentina supplying the rest.
However, for the markets of Algeria and Tunisia, Argentina has been making
inroads (USDA/FAS, 2003b) at the expense of the U.S. Since 1998S99, global trade
of maize has expanded by 7 million tons to 75.7 million tons, while U.S. exports
have shrunk by 5 million tons (USDA/FAS, 2003a).
One might expect that the differences between U.S. and Argentina maize price
dynamics may also reflect the differences in quality of maize exports. A rise in the
price of lower quality maize might lead to a faster rise in the price of higher quality
maize, while a decline in lower quality maize prices might have little effect because
importers might be willing to pay a premium for higher quality maize. It is surprising
to find that even though Argentine maize is considered to be of higher quality than
the maize exported by the U.S. (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
1989), the dynamic behavior of price adjustment does not support this hypothesis.
Rather, the results suggest a more important role is played by market share than by
quality differences. Further, the finding of U.S. price leadership can be attributed to
the fact that the U.S. is the largest exporter of maize. The price of U.S. maize
appears to evolve independently. Argentina’s exports of maize are significantly
lower, and therefore Argentina seems to act as a price follower. Argentinean prices
respond to correct for any deviation caused in the long-run relationship with U.S.
maize prices.
Conclusion
A novel method advanced by Enders and Siklos (2001) was employed to test the
hypothesis of cointegration with asymmetric adjustment, and was applied to the U.S.
and Argentinean maize export prices. Both of these countries are major exporters of
maize. The method extends the Engle-Granger procedure allowing for either TAR
or momentum TAR adjustment toward the cointegrating vector. If asymmetry exists,
the power of the M-TAR test is higher than that of the Engle-Granger test (Enders,
2001).
The results of the cointegration tests under both symmetric and asymmetric
adjustment reveal that the maize export prices of the U.S. and Argentina are tied
together in a long-run relationship—implying arbitrage from the supply side or
substitution from the demand side binds the prices together over time. This result has
implications for grain traders and farmers, and supports the contention that in recent
years Argentina has emerged as a tough competitor to the U.S. If the degree of
integration were to be low, then grain exporting companies could earn excess profits
by buying maize from farmers at very low prices.90   Spring 2006 Journal of Agribusiness
In testing for asymmetric adjustment, little evidence is found when using the
consistent TAR model. However, where evidence of asymmetry is detected, the
consistent M-TAR model best fits the data. Price asymmetry is the market’s inability
to respond similarly to either a rise or a fall in prices. An over-reaction to price
increases while remaining opposed to price decreases could indicate the presence of
market power among traders of the dominant exporting country. It does not come as
a surprise that the findings of this study suggest an asymmetric nature of price
adjustment. Given that the international maize market has a structure more consistent
with a duopoly than a perfectly competitive market, the price transmission is
expected to be asymmetric. The U.S. holds the largest market share in the
international maize market which can be cited as the source of asymmetric price
transmission.
As noted earlier, the international maize market is highly concentrated. This
nature of export market concentration supports the contention that the world maize
market is imperfectly competitive. Under these circumstances, some form of
strategic interaction may be expected between the major exporters of maize. The
results indicate Argentina shows greater responsiveness to decreasing U.S. prices
than increasing U.S. prices. Further, inventory-holding behavior by the U.S. and
Argentina may also lead to asymmetries, as high international price expectations
lead to stock accumulation (Rapsomanikis, Hallam, and Conforti, 2003).
The weak exogeneity tests on the threshold error correction model show that the
U.S. is found to act as a price leader. This finding suggests the structure of maize
trade is such that the U.S. markets are largely insulated from influences flowing from
Argentina, while Argentine maize prices are not insulated from U.S. influences. The
result has important implications for grain traders, as it reflects the mechanisms used
by each country to implement pricing policies for their exports of maize. Argentine
maize traders might be using the U.S. maize price as a reference when setting their
own export prices. This is true of exporting firms, as Argentine export prices tend
to be more highly correlated with the U.S. prices than domestic prices (Lence, 2000).
This result supports the assertion of Perkins, Snickers, and Geldard (1984) that the
U.S., with the largest market share, effectively sets the world price, and other
exporters adjust their prices in response to any deviation in the U.S. price. The
results further suggest that agricultural policies of Argentina which aim toward
improving the quality of maize to compete with the U.S. would not have an effect
on the long-run relation between the prices.
This study highlights the fact that the maize export prices are highly integrated,
and the prices are set through a process of strategic interaction where the U.S. plays
the role of a price leader and Argentina responds in an asymmetric fashion to any
variations in the U.S. price. These results are of significance as they add to our
understanding of how the international maize market operates.Ghoshray U.S. and Argentine Maize Prices   91
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